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One easily might get the impression from taking a course in consti-
tutional law or from dipping into judicial and academic discussion that
the adjective "constitutional" has no true nominal counterpart. The
words "the Constitution" appear often enough, to be sure, but an atten-
tive law student soon realizes that the expression often is being used as a
mere placeholder for the truly operative concepts: what the Supreme
Court has held; what the "right" political theory requires; even what I
(judge, lawyer, politician) prefer. At its least destructive, that perception
of the meaning of constitutional law leads to what might be called
"Court-positivism" 1-the almost automatic assumption that the Consti-
tution is indeed "what the judges say it is. '2 At its worst, the perception
results in a cynicism about constitutional discussion that is personally
and socially corrosive.
The extent to which Americans from every current political and
philosophical persuasion share this perception of the Constitution's emp-
tiness must not be underestimated. Individuals on the left charge that
constitutional discourse is a mere facade to cover the majority's socioeco-
nomic power relationships. 3 Spokespersons for the right characterize
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their views as faithful to the Constitution,4 but the claim is illusory: sim-
ple majoritarianism and rigid historicism are both flights from dealing
with an objectively real Constitution.
It is in this rather bleak setting that Walter Murphy, James Flem-
ing, and William Harris have sounded the call for a return to the Consti-
tution as an objective reality, in the classroom and, I hope, in the broader
world as well. Their American Constitutional Interpretation 5 is a course-
book6 that treats the Constitution itself as the subject of constitutional
discussion, and not as a convenient tag for labeling Supreme Court deci-
sions. I will first describe the contents and organization of the book. I
will then comment upon its significance for legal education. I conclude
with a discussion of the constitutional theory underlying the book, which
I call "constitutional objectivism."
I. A DESCRIPTION OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Murphy, Fleming, and Harris have discarded the traditional
casebook's shopworn arrangement of Supreme Court decisions under
doctrinal headings. 7 The authors provide three lengthy introductory
chapters as well as essays prefacing each section in the main part of the
book. In the first chapter, Murphy, Fleming, and Harris introduce the
reader to some of the primary characteristics of constitutional discourse:
the varying degrees of clarity in the constitutional text, the unavoidable
potential for conflict in the text's provisions, the incompleteness of the
Constitution, and the problems that arise from new concerns and unfore-
seen developments. They then lay out three basic questions around
which the book is organized (p. 9):
1. WHAT is the Constitution that is to be interpreted?
2. WHO are the Constitution's authoritative interpreters?
4. For an excellent overview and critique of New Right constitutionalism, see S. MACEDO,
THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION (1986).
5. W. MURPHY, J. FLEMING & W. HARRIS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
(1986) [hereinafter cited by page reference alone].
6. The publisher is not marketing the book as a law school casebook, which is unfortunate if
law teachers are thereby led to ignore it. One purpose of this review is to urge those who teach in
law schools to disregard Foundation's marketing decision.
I use the clumsy term "coursebook" in preference to the familiar "casebook" or "textbook"
because those other labels are misleading. American Constitutional Interpretation is neither simply a
text written by the authors nor a collection of cases surrounded by supplementary material, but
includes essays, judicial and extrajudicial opinions, excerpts from legislative proceedings, and so on.
By its very form the book presents the reader with a broader and more accurate slice of American
constitutional discourse than does the usual casebook.
7. In this respect, the authors have followed the lead of another important but radically differ-
ent book by Paul Brest and Sanford Levinson. See P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CON-
STITUTIONAI. DECISIONMAKING (2d ed. 1983).
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3. HOW can/should/do those interpreters accomplish their
tasks?
The chapter concludes with a concise discussion of the purposes and
techniques of reading judicial opinions.
The second chapter provides the student with another useful tool for
thought and analysis. Murphy, Fleming, and Harris categorize the polit-
ical theories at work in American constitutional discourse along a spec-
trum running from that of the "Pure Constitutionalist," who regards the
Constitution's purpose to be the limitation of governmental power and
the protection of substantive rights, to that of the "Pure Representative
Democrat," who endorses majority rule so long as the appropriate insti-
tutional conditions-free and fair elections, universal suffrage, and free
political discussion 8-are met. The authors point out that the constitu-
tional viewpoints actually held in our society usually fall toward the
center of that spectrum, and that even the "pure" positions share a com-
mon commitment to individual dignity, equality of rights, and the pre-
vention of official oppression. The chapter then illustrates the
Constitutionalist versus Democrat dichotomy through a brief introduc-
tion to the constitutional thought of the founders, presented properly as
debate and discussion, not unitary "intent."
The third introductory chapter gives the political and institutional
background of contemporary constitutional discussion in a manner fa-
miliar to those who know Professor Murphy's earlier work. The core of
the chapter consists of an examination of the procedural and political
context of Korematsu v. United States9 as well as the intra-Court activi-
ties that preceded the resolution of that case. Students who read Ameri-
can Constitutional Interpretation will not be misled into believing the
common classroom fiction that Supreme Court decisions descend from
some judicial Mount Sinai untouched by human doubt, debate, or
passion.
The heart of the book begins with section II (chapters four and five).
Section II addresses the authors' first question (p. 81): "WHAT is the
Constitution?" In chapter four, the authors introduce the debate over
textual versus extratextual interpretation. By introducing this issue with
Calder v. Bull, 10 the authors strike a blow against the ahistorical notion
that Earl Warren and his colleagues invented those methods of constitu-
8. The authors' brief discussion (pp. 30-32) of the substantive values held by the "Pure Repre-
sentative Democrat" which are necessary to render the process-oriented theory workable lays the
groundwork for their consistent refusal to accept-or to impose on students-the analytically un-
helpful dichotomy between process and substance.
9. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
10. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798).
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tional interpretation that look beyond the document's four corners. Cal-
der is followed by a series of substantive due process cases that the
authors skillfully use to explore the history and limits of attempts to de-
fine "the Constitution" as something equal to or greater than the 1787
document and its amendments. Few constitutional law courses begin
with cases like Calder and Griswold v. Connecticut, I" but the innovation
makes logical and pedagogical sense in that it compels the student to
consider the fundamental question of what is the constitutional "text"
that is to be interpreted.
Chapter five addresses the related question of "continuity and
change": Does the Constitution, however defined, consist of a set of
commands or principles fixed at the time of its adoption and amend-
ment? If not, in what sense does the Constitution retain an objective
identity across time and through the vicissitudes of history? To further
the discussion, the authors present a variety of viewpoints: Holmes's ev-
olutionary nationalism in Missouri v. Holland, 12 the debate over the au-
thority of historical understanding in The Minnesota Moratorium Case, 13
the role of changing standards in eighth amendment and equal protection
decisions, and the Burger Court's invocation of longstanding practice in
the legislative chaplaincy case. 14 The chapter ends with the juxtaposition
of radically opposing viewpoints: Chief Justice Rehnquist's intentional-
ism and Professor Dworkin's concept/conception distinction.
Section III addresses the authors' second question (p. 182): "WHO
shall interpret the Constitution?" Murphy, Fleming, and Harris present
this question as a twofold inquiry, asking who interprets for the national
government and who does so for the federal system. Under each sub-
heading, the authors outline the historically viable answers. The ques-
tion of who resolves intrafederal constitutional disputes is developed in a
wide-ranging set of materials, including such unusual treats as the 1802
United States Senate debates over repealing the Midnight Judges Act,
Lincoln's First Inaugural, and speeches by Professor Tribe and Judge
Noonan on the Human Life Bill, as well as Marbury v. Madison 15 and
Katzenbach v. Morgan. 16 As to who is the authoritative interpreter for
the federal system, the authors focus on the historical debate between
proponents of state sovereignty and proponents of federal judicial
supremacy, and include presentations of the states' rights position well-
11. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
12. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
13. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
14. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
15. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
16. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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known to historical scholars but often unfamiliar to law students: the
chapter pairs the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, an excerpt from one of
John C. Calhoun's treatises, and the Southern Manifesto of 1956 with
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 17 Ableman v. Booth, 18 and Cooper v. Aaron. 19
Three-quarters of the book is devoted to the third question posed by
the authors (p. 286): "HOW does one interpret the Constitution in a
coherent and intellectually defensible manner?" This fundamental ques-
tion is introduced by a superb and imaginative organizational chapter
(chapter eight), where Murphy, Fleming, and Harris provide the student
with a three-part hierarchical outline of interpretive methodology. On
the highest level of abstraction and generality are what they label "ap-
proaches to interpretation." An "approach" embodies answers to the
authors' first two questions, that is, it involves decisions for or against
text-bound interpretation and for or against acceptance of constitutional
change. In addition, the authors suggest, an approach also involves a
basic vision of the Constitution either as a set of constraining rules for
government or as a collection of aspirations for society as a whole (pp.
290-91).
The intermediate level of interpretive methodology consists, in the
authors' terminology, of "modes of analysis"-the ways in which an in-
terpreter "utilizes [an] approach[ ] in the enterprise of constitutional in-
terpretation" (p. 289). The generally accepted modes described by the
authors include verbal, historical, structural, doctrinal, prudential, and
purposive (or teleological) analyses.
In contrast to the possible approaches and modes of analysis, which
may be intuitive or unacknowledged, the lowest level of interpretive
method involves the conscious adoption of interpretive techniques. The
choice among techniques, like the selection of modes of analysis, is not
unlimited or purely tactical. Murphy, Fleming, and Harris acknowledge
that the interpreter's approach influences and shapes the employment of
particular analytic modes, while the modes constrain the choice of tech-
nique. The authors propose for the student six commonly used tech-
niques: literal interpretation, deduction, induction, framers' intent, stare
decisis, and value balancing. An appendix to the chapter explains why
the authors reject certain frequently invoked dichotomies as unhelpful.20
17. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
18. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
19. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
20. The book as a whole exposes the unproductive character of disputes framed according to
dichotomies such as strict versus liberal construction, judicial activism versus judicial restraint, sub-
stance versus procedure, and intepretivism versus noninterpretivism (pp. 313-16).
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The bulk of American Constitutional Interpretation consists of chap-
ters nine through seventeen, which explore in detail the methodology of
constitutional interpretation. The authors first present a structural anal-
ysis of intrafederal disputes. As in other sections of the book, the ordi-
nary (United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,2 1 The Steel Seizure
Case,22 the War Powers Resolution,23 and INS v. Chadha24) coexists
with the extraordinary (The Flying Fish, 25 Justice Brennan's confirma-
tion hearings, and President Roosevelt's rejection of the legislative veto).
The link drawn between cases traditionally regarded as raising separation
of powers issues, and those usually treated as matters of federal jurisdic-
tion, is especially illuminating. Structuralism and the federal system,
however, are presented in a rather traditional way;2 6 the authors trace a
steadily increasing recognition of national power from McCulloch v.
Maryland, 27 through Crandall v. Nevada, 28 to the post-Civil War recon-
siderations in The Slaughter-House Cases, 29 National League of Cities v.
Usery, 30 and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.31
The purposive modes of interpretation that subserve democracy are
the subject of chapters eleven and twelve. The authors provide in chap-
ter eleven a fairly extensive set of Supreme Court cases to present the
theme of protecting political speech; the role of political participation is
illustrated in chapter twelve by selected decisions from the reapportion-
ment, association, and campaign regulation cases. The authors then deal
with equal protection in chapters thirteen and fourteen, providing the
standard array of race cases and most of the usual nonrace equal protec-
tion decisions.
The treatment of fundamental rights adjudication as a "mode" of
interpretation is fresh and imaginative. The introductory text of chapter
fifteen outlines the history of the constitutional protection of property
21. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
22. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
23. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982).
24. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
25. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
26. The authors' usual sensitivity to the complexities of constitutional history is inadequately
employed in chapter 10, which would have benefited by reproducing materials of a nonnationalistic
flavor, such as United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33-34 (1812) (denying
existence of federal common law of crimes on structural grounds); and Mayor of New York v. Miln,
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 138 (1837) (holding state police power "complete, unqualified and exclusive").
As noted above, the book does provide the student (in an earlier chapter) with the seminal presenta-
tion of states' rights constitutionalism, the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798.
27. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
28. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
29. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
30. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
31. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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and the materials that follow present the views of Locke, Madison, Mar-
shall, Taney, the Lochner Court, and the Roosevelt appointees, and
culminate with the Court's remarkable decision in Hawaii Housing Au-
thority v. Midkiff3 2 The substantive constitutional value of property is
followed, logically but innovatively, by the substantive constitutional
value of religious freedom. The selection of materials is orthodox; 33 their
placement and editorial treatment are not. The third part of the book's
treatment of fundamental fights analysis, chapter seventeen, addresses
the highly controversial issue of substantive privacy rights. The cases are
arranged thematically, and the editorial materials successfully link the
chapter to issues arising earlier in the book.
The final chapter deals with the role of the Constitution in border-
line situations, when the nation's needs or fears seem to call for govern-
mental action that extends beyond the ordinary constitutional limits. To
stimulate contemplation and debate, the authors present materials on the
crises of Jefferson's administration, the Civil War, World War II, and the
extralegal behavior of the Nixon administration.
American Constitutional Interpretation is characterized by sophisti-
cated and innovative uses of intelligently edited original materials. The
editorial text and apparatus provide useful background information and
conceptual tools; the authors also challenge the student by a judicious
selection of questions. Each essay and chapter is accompanied by a brief,
useful bibliography.
II. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
AS A TEACHING BOOK
American legal education today is often said to be in a state of crisis.
American lawyers, of course, have been worrying about the professional
and political adequacy of legal education since the birth of the Republic.
Nevertheless, the contemporary concern may be especially warranted:
legal education in the late twentieth century law school, especially in the
crucial first year, remains based on a method devised by late nineteenth
century law professors. Given the almost universal repudiation of
Langdellian legal science, it is rather odd that the heirs of legal realism,
indeed even the disciples of critical legal studies, continue to follow the
case-orientation and employ the doctrinal organization that Langdell and
32. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). Without dissent, the Midkiff court upheld an exercise of state eminent
domain power that in effect simply transferred, with compensation, plots of real property from one
person to another. Cf Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (seriatim opinion of Chase, J.,
denying constitutionality of such governmental action).
33. This section does, however, contain an excerpt from a statement by Roman Catholic Bish-
ops in response to the renewal of military draft registration (pp. 1062-65).
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company rendered canonical.3 4
As a teaching tool, this book deserves the highest marks for its
largely successful escape from prerealist pedagogy. Murphy, Fleming,
and Harris avoid overemphasizing Supreme Court opinions. In particu-
lar, they avoid the tendency to overemphasize Marbury and the issue of
judicial review, 35 a tendency that often leaves the student with the im-
pression that constitutional discourse is something that the Justices do
and the rest of us observe. Instead, the book presents to its reader ample
evidence that the Court does not enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over consti-
tutional interpretation. By leading students to reflect on the process and
means of constitutional interpretation, the book encourages readers
actively to engage in it, and not simply to react to the Court's pro-
nouncements.
The focus on interpretation should enable readers more easily to
avoid another unintended consequence of traditional teaching materials:
the sense that "constitutional law" is not so much a single subject as a
catch-all label for a set of discrete and largely unrelated doctrines-feder-
alism, equal protection, freedom of speech, the ban on an establishment
of religion, the commerce power, and so on.36 In doing so, the authors
make a powerful if largely implicit argument on behalf of a particular
vision of constitutional discourse, a vision that is the subject of my final
section.37 But American Constitutional Interpretation is not a partisan or
polemical book; the fairness with which the authors present divergent
constitutional theories makes the book usable by teachers of widely dif-
fering viewpoints.
American Constitutional Interpretation is a significant contribution
to the teaching and study of the United States Constitution. But it may
also be something else-one of the first signs that a truly post-Langdel-
lian legal education is emerging. Ever since the coming of age of legal
realism, the professoriat has fitfully recognized a need to expand and
deepen what we offer our students, and to escape the reductionism that
34. See, eg., H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE
(1984).
35. Brest and Levinson also avoid the standard treatment of this aspect of constitutional law.
See P. BREST & S. LEvINSON, supra note 7, at 172-98 (introducing federalism through provocative
case study of the early controversy over a national bank).
36. The single most significant pedagogical problem that the book may present, for law school
teachers, concerns the commerce clause, in both its positive, power-granting, and negative, state-
restricting, aspects. Inclusion of a few teaching tools for this purpose-for example, cases such as
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942), and a selection from the Senate Committee hearings on the 1964 Civil Rights Act-
would enhance the book's usability in the law school classroom. In a second edition, I hope the
authors will consider addressing this concern.
37. See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
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regards, for example, contracts as well-taught when the students have
been exposed to a selection of edited appellate court opinions organized
in accordance with a doctrinal system unknown to the makers of con-
tracts and of limited relevance to the lawyers who advise them. Much
has been said about the need to equip aspiring lawyers with the insights
of sociology, history, psychology, economics, and the other social sci-
ences. In more recent years, this call has been joined by the superficially
conflicting demand that law teachers devote more energy to equipping
their students to be better practitioners.
The reformers' sermons have not been wholly successful. It is true
that the casebook-in Dean Langdell's day a compendium of cases en-
tirely devoid of editorial or extrajudicial comment-is now justifiably en-
titled "Cases and Materials on . . ." or some variant thereof. But even
though appellate opinions are hardly a good sample of "law" from the
social scientist's perspective, and despite the fact that few practicing law-
yers are regularly involved in evoking or producing them, reading cases
remains the central focus of the law school course and the student's per-
ception of the law. Most law teachers will be familiar with the resulting
difficulty one encounters in persuading second- and third-year students
to treat materials other than appellate opinions with equal seriousness.
The thrust toward greater professionalization is in danger of enter-
ing an analogous educational cul-de-sac. Even though most law schools
now have clinical programs, those programs and the teachers who ad-
minister them are often seen as separate from the main educational pro-
gram of the law school. 38 The effort to professionalize legal education,
like the struggle to "intellectualize" it, may be compartmentalized and
thereby neutralized in the not-too-distant future.
This bleak future is not inevitable, however, and we need not accept
the widespread assumption that greater professionalism and enhanced
scholarly rigor are contradictory. American Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, I suggest, shows that this assumption is unwarranted. The concern
of Murphy, Fleming, and Harris is with precisely what practicing law-
yers do all the time: interpret (make sense of) and explicate (present
arguments about the meaning of) legally significant documents. The stu-
dent's attention is directed toward the acquisition of these professional
skills of argument and documentary construction rather than to the mas-
tery of academic theories about Supreme Court decisions. In doing so,
Murphy, Fleming, and Harris have bridged the gap between academia's
call for intellectual enrichment and the call by bench and bar for more
38. One would think that academic lawyers even more than other people would recognize that
separate seldom means equal.
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"practical" instruction. The book employs sophisticated tools from
political science, hermeneutics, and history in order to develop the intel-
lectual and forensic abilities of its readers. The result is a coursebook
more professional and more intellectual than the ordinary.39
III. THE VISION OF THE BOOK: CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIVISM
In the history of American constitutional thought, the 1970's and
1980's will go down as the Era of the Big Theory. Academics, judges,
and even an attorney general have proposed and debated grand visions of
how constitutional interpreters should go about their task. But despite
the great differences among the theorists, most of them have shared a
crucial presupposition: that the Constitution itself does not have "a
meaning independent of what anyone in particular might want it to
mean." 4 This presupposition is seldom acknowledged, and few of the
theorists would follow it to its logical, nihilistic conclusion, but the pre-
supposition is nonetheless there. The role of constitutional theory there-
fore becomes one of filling in the awkward conceptual gap created by the
disappearance of an objective Constitution.
Expressed differently, theory must provide the interpreter some-
thing to interpret, because the putative object, the Constitution, cannot
do so. Thus, for example, we are sometimes told that the real "constitu-
tion" or fundamental political principle of the United States is represen-
tative democracy. The theorist's job, therefore, is to reconcile judicial
review with this fundamental principle either by insisting on extreme ju-
dicial deference to majoritarian decisionmaking, 41 or by limiting the
courts to policing the political process.42 Or we are exhorted to follow a
jurisprudence of original intent43 whereby the interpreter's role is not to
construe the Constitution, but to obey a speculative reconstruction of
political principles the framers wanted enforced but perversely or incom-
39. In this exciting combination, the book parallels the recent professional responsibility
coursebook by Professor Thomas Shaffer. T. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READ-
INGS, AND DISCUSSION Topics (1985). Professor Shaffer's work forces both instructor and student
to deal with the ongoing ethical tradition of Western culture at the same time that it directly ad-
dresses the concerns of practicing American lawyers.
40. S. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 13 (1984). Professor Barber's excellent
book is a defense of the claim that the Constitution does have an independent or objective meaning,
and is the most extended theoretical exposition to date of what I call in this review "constitutional
objectivism."
41. See, eg., R. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 7-8 (1984);
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
42. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-75 (1980).
43. See Address by Attorney General Meese, American Bar Association 4, 11 (July 17, 1985)
(available in U.S. Dep't of Justice, Current Documents 1985, Fiche No. 116).
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petently failed to put into the text itself.44 Or we are told that the real
"constitution" is the system of human rights required by some extracon-
stitutional political theory.45 Perhaps the most common viewpoint of all
is that "the Constitution" is what the Supreme Court says it is.46
In their book, Murphy, Fleming, and Harris have presented a pow-
erful, if largely implicit, case for "constitutional objectivism" 47-the view
that constitutional interpretation does have its own particular proper ob-
ject. Thus, when we argue about a constitutional issue, we can find
meaning separate from the predilections of the interpreter.
Murphy, Fleming, and Harris, of course, are not propounding some
sort of naive faith in a mythical plain meaning. The meaning of the con-
stitutional document is often opaque, and interpretations can be debata-
ble or even wrong. Even more fundamentally, the authors do not insist
that "the Constitution" is simply equivalent to the text of the document.
The extent and contents of the object of constitutional interpretation are
acknowledged to be questions for the interpreter.
Constitutional objectivism is not, then, a new version of Justice
Hugo Black's literalism.48 The objectivist can recognize the open-ended
nature of the document, and the connection between the document and
the polity it creates and describes. But constitutional objectivism, in con-
trast to most modem theories, approaches the "text" to be interpreted-
document plus polity-as itself the primary source of the interpreter's
methodology. What is fundamentally wrong with contemporary theo-
ries, whether majoritarianism, egalitarianism, intentionalism, or the vari-
ous rights theories, is their insistence on according fundamental
authority to a priori and extratextual premises. The result may be politi-
cally or philosophically admirable, but it is not constitutional interpreta-
tion as the objectivist understands that enterprise. Interpretation of a
fundamental and normative text is necessarily a posteriori-determined
methodologically by the text and the structure of the institutions it cre-
ates. Professor Sotirios Barber's recent study suggests the possibility of a
constitutional hermeneutic that obeys this objectivist canon.49 Murphy,
44. In his book on contemporary right-wing constitutional thought, Professor Stephen Macedo
powerfully critiques the contradictions within the majoritarianism-plus-original-intent theory pro-
pounded by Meese, Bork, and others. See S. MACEDO, supra note 4, at 21.
45. See, e-g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 73-75
(1980).
46. See Powell, supra note 1, at 1136-38 (describing Professor Tribe's work as tending toward
this position).
47. I dislike the phrase, but the other obvious candidate, "constitutional realism," seems likely
to invoke erroneous connotations of legal realism.
48. See H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 7-12 (1969).
49. See S. BARBER, supra note 40.
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Fleming, and Harris provide the raw materials, and the conceptual tools,
for constructing a similar interpretive approach.
Constitutional objectivism, unlike result-oriented approaches, recog-
nizes the legitimacy of interpretive pluralism. If we really are addressing
an object separate from our own preferences, we inevitably will disagree
at times on the most appropriate interpretation. What objectivism avoids
is the conversion of constitutional discourse into another form of partisan
political dispute. When the autonomy of the Constitution is effectively
recognized, the interpreter's results no longer conform to our customary
ideological categories.50 The vision of Murphy, Fleming, and Harris
transcends and cuts across the debates between Justice Brennan and
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Professor Monaghan and Professor Perry. 51
The Constitution, both the historical document and its polity, is
designed to include among "We the People" persons of significantly dif-
ferent political viewpoints. In contrast to the reductionistic approaches
of some modem theorists, whose ultimate goal often seems to be to elimi-
nate constitutional choice and dispute,52 the Constitution creates a
bounded but nevertheless somewhat indeterminate sphere of discourse.
Within this sphere, interpreters can conduct meaningful debate because
they share a common allegiance to the bounds of the sphere and to the
forms of discussion found within it. Rather than predetermining sub-
stantive results, as do the theories of the right, constitutional objectivism
questions whether any given position can be justified, by appropriate and
historically accepted methods, from text and polity. Rather than deny
limits to the interpreter's choice among forms of argument, as do the
theories of the left, constitutional objectivism questions whether any
given method can be justified, in the light of appropriate and historically
accepted positions, from text and polity. Objectivism recaptures the fun-
damental insight that constitutional interpretation is something we all
can and ought to do, and which can cut against the particular results we
would prefer to reach.
Constitutional objectivism is widespread in American society as a
whole; most judges, lawyers, legislators, and citizens probably assume
50. See id. at 90-101 (criticizing certain judicial interpretations of federal power as pretextual
and illegitimate); S. MACEDO, supra note 4, at 30-31 (arguing for judicial activism in both civil rights
area and economic liberties area).
51. Any recent volume of the United States Reports will illustrate the ongoing debate between
Justices Brennan and Chief Justice Rehnquist. For the academic debate over whether "originalism"
is the most appropriate interpretive approach, compare Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981) (yes) with Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A
Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985) (no).
52. Professor Tribe recently published a sustained and powerful critique of this flight from
controversy. L. TRIBE, CONsTITUTIONAL CHOICES 9-20 (1985).
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that the Constitution has independent meaning.5 3 But I suspect that the
opposite may be true in the law faculty lounge and, most unfortunately,
in the law school classroom. The denial of meaning to an objective Con-
stitution is ultimately destructive of constitutional discourse, which be-
comes nothing more than "Civil War carried on by other means."'54 If
"the Constitution" means nothing more than whatever a legislative ma-
jority or five Supreme Court Justices prefer, then the American experi-
ment in a constitutional polity that combines democracy and limited
government has failed. American Constitutional Interpretation is a sus-
tained rejection of that despairing conclusion. In their book, Murphy,
Fleming, and Harris have offered the Constitution and the Republic a
splendid bicentennial anniversary present.
53. Other recent works produced by members of the emerging school of constitutional objectiv-
ism include S. BARBER, supra note 40; S. MACEDO, supra note 4; Harris, Bonding Word and Polity:
The Logic of American Constitutionalism, 76 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 34 (1982); Murphy, An Ordering
of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703 (1980); Murphy, Constitutional Interpretation: The
Art of the Historian, Magician, or Statesman?, 87 YALE L.J. 1752 (1978); Powell, supra note 1; and
Powell, Parchment Matters: A Meditat* n on the Constitution as Text, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1427
(1986). These writers illustrate the intrinsic pluralism of an objectivist view of the Constitution;
although their specific positions often differ, they fundamentally agree on what Murphy, Fleming,
and Harris label an interpretive "approach."
54. A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 253 (2d ed. 1984).
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